PRESENTA: Andrés Fioriti (UNS)
Andrés Fioriti es Investigador Adjunto de CONICET, en el Instituto de Matemática de Bahía Blanca (INMABB) y docente del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (UNS). Tiene un PhD en Economía por University of Warwick (Reino Unido) y es Magíster en Economía y Licenciado en Economía por la UNS. También es Profesor Visitante en la UBA y ha realizado estancias de investigación en Arizona State University (2015, Estados Unidos) y University of Queensland (2020, Australia). Sus investigaciones se centran en temas de Teoría Microeconómica, con aplicaciones a Economía de la Información, Diseño de mecanismos, Teoría de los juegos y Finanzas corporativas. Sus trabajos han sido publicados en revistas académicas como Chaos, International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, Mathematics, Regional Statistics, Empirical Economics, Management Science, Quality & Quantity, Journal of Informetrics, European Economic Review e International Journal of Finance and Economics, entre otras.

ABSTRACT: Firms' issuance of non-linear securities, such as debt or options, creates risk-shifting incentives that may lead to inefficient outcomes. This widely accepted result rests on the assumption that firms' control rights are coupled with the residual claims, and thus held by equity holders. We relax this assumption and analyze a setting where cash-flow and control rights are allocated independently. Although payoffs are determined solely by rights over realized cash flows, control rights hold value because they influence the probability distribution of those cash flows. Cash-flow and control rights often act as substitutes, but cash-flow rights can reduce investors' payoff when their impact on decision-making is sufficiently strong. When issuers and holders of a non-linear security have sufficiently distinct cash-flow rights, the equilibrium features efficiency with full surplus extraction; as their cash-flow rights converge, a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction emerges. In that case, a sufficiently skewed distribution of payoffs can restore efficiency.

AUTORES: Andrés Fioriti (UNS), Allan Hernández Chanton (University of Queensland) & Guillem Ordóñez Calado (University of Bristol)

ORGANIZA: Departamento de Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Revista Económica

CONTACTO: iie@econo.unlp.edu.ar