Seminario de Investigación "The Incidence of Affirmative Action: Evidence from Quotas in Private Schools in India"

El seminario destinado a docentes, investigadores, becarios y estudiantes interesados en la temática, se realizó el viernes 20 de mayo a las 12:30 horas por videoconferencia. La presentación estuvo a cargo de Mauricio Romero (ITAM).

Mauricio Romero es Profesor en el Centro de Investigación Económica del Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) e Investigador Principal en RISE India. Tiene un PhD en Economía por la Universidad de California, San Diego y es Licenciado en Economía y Licenciado en Matemática por la Universidad de los Andes. Sus investigaciones se centran en temas de Economía del Desarrollo, Economía de la Salud, Economía Pública y Aplicaciones de Microeconomía y Econometría y han sido publicadas en revistas académicas como American Economic Review, Journal of Development Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Ecoomic Journal y European Economic Review, entre otras.

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of India’s main school-integration policy - a 25% quota in private schools for disadvantaged students, whose fees are reimbursed by the state - on direct beneficiaries. Combining survey and administrative data from the state of Chhattisgarh, with lottery-based allocation of seats in oversubscribed schools, we show that receiving a quota seat makes students more likely to attend a private school (by 25 percentage points), and attend schools which are more expensive, more preferred, and more likely to offer English-medium instruction. However, within eligible caste groups, quota applicants are drawn disproportionately from more-educated and economically better-off households, and three-quarters of the applicants who were not allotted a quota seat also attended a private school as fee-paying students. Consequently, we estimate that ∼ 67% of the total expenditure on each quota seat is inframarginal to school choice. Using rich survey data on hypothetical household choices and subjective expectations, we show that this regressive selection is not primarily explained by a lack of demand or residential segregation. Rather, information and application frictions appear central. We implemented a follow-up randomized home-visits intervention to provide information and reduce application complexity. Our results suggest that such interventions may raise application rates but, without concomitant support to the poorest households in obtaining requisite documentation, would not fully address regressive selection.

Autores: Mauricio Romero (ITAM) y Abhijeet Singh (Stockholm School of Economics)

Organizan: Departamento de Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Revista Económica


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