Andreas Stegmann es Profesor Asociado del Departamento de Economía en University of Warwick e investigador en el Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) de la misma Universidad.  También es investigador en el Centre for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP) e Investigador invitado en J-PAL. Tiene un PhD en Economía por el CEMFI, donde también ha dictado cursos de grado y posgrado. Sus investigaciones se centran en temas de economía política y desarrollo y sus trabajos han sido publicados en revistas académicas como Econometrica, The Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of the European Economic Association y Journal of Public Economics, entre otras.

Abstract: We study how elections affect bureaucratic performance at the local level. Indonesian villages democratically elect a new leader every six years. Combining detailed personnel surveys with a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we show that electoral defeats of the incumbent village head increase turnover in the village bureaucracy by more than 40%, and reduce nepotism. Bureaucrats led by new leaders are more enthusiastic about their work, more ambitious, more highly paid, and less likely to be connected to past or present village government members. They interact substantially more with village citizens and have a better understanding of their preferences. This leads to higher levels of public service provision, measured in both administrative data and surveys conducted with citizens. In spite of this, citizens' trust in their village government remains unaffected in the short run. Our findings shed new light on the positive effects of leader turnover on bureaucratic morale and performance.

Autores: Samuel Bazzi (UC San Diego), Masyhur Hilmy (University of New South Wales), Ben Marx (Boston University), Mahvish Shaukat (World Bank) & Andreas Stegmann (University of Warwick)

Organizan: Departamento de Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Revista Económica

Contacto: iie@econo.unlp.edu.ar