Cuerpo docente
Moneda crédito y banco - Programa
Campus Virtual
1. Modelos monetarios simples
Patinkin, D. (1965). Money, Interest and Prices. Harper & Row.
Sidrauski, M. (1967). Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Economy. American Economic Review,2, 534-544.
Hirschleifer, J. (1970). Investment, Interest and Capital. Esp. Cap. 5. Prentice Hall.
Champ, B. y S. Freeman (1994). Cap. 1, 3 y 5.
Doepke, Lehnert & Sellgren (1999). Macroeconomics. Cap 8. Manuscript.
Kehoe, Tim (1989). Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models. En The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games, Frank Hahn (ed.), Clarendon Press.
Sargent, T. (1987). Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Harvard University Press. Cap. 5.
Ljunqvist, L. y T. Sargent, T. (2000). Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. Cap. 8.
Samuelson, P. (1958). An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money. Journal of Political Economy, 66 (December), 467-482.
Wallace, N. (1980). The Overlapping Generations Model of Fiat Money. En Models of Monetary Economics. J. Kareken and N. Wallace eds. 49-82.
Clower, R. (1967). A Reconsideration of the Foundations of Monetary Theory. En R, Clower, ed.: Monetary Theory.
Ostroy, J. y R. Starr (1990). The Transactions Role of Money. Handbook of Monetary Economics.
Kiyotaki, N. and Wright, R. (1989). On Money as a Medium of Exchange. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (4) pp. 927-54.
2. Inflación y estabilización; moneda y ciclo económico
Heymann, D. y A. Leijonhufvud (1995). High Inflation. Oxford University Press.
Blanchard, O. y S. Fischer (1989). Lectures on Macroeconomics. MIT Press.
Sargent, T. y N. Wallace (1981). Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Sargent, T. (1982). The End of Four Big Inflations. En Robert Hall (ed.) Inflation: Causes and Effects, 41-97.
Lucas. R. (1981). Studies in Business Cycle Theory. MIT Press.
Aiyagari, S. Rao (1989). Deflating the Zero Cost for Inflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. (Summer). 2-11.
Sargent, T. (1987). Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Harvard University Press. Cap. 7
.
Wallace, N. (1984). Some of the choices of Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. (Winter), 15-24.
3. Instituciones monetarias
Barro, R. J. y D. B. Gordon. (1983). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 1, 101-121.
Flood, R. y P. Isard (1989). Rules with Escape Clauses, IMF Staff Papers.
Kydland, F. E. & E. C. Prescott. (1977). Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 3, 473-491.
Lohmann, S. (1992). Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility. American Economic Review. 82, 1, (March): 276-286.
Persson, T. y G. Tabellini, (1990) Macroeconomics, Credibility and Politics. Harwood Academic Publishers.
Svensson, L. (2002). What is wrong with Taylor Rules. NBER Working Paper, 9421
Heymann, D. y P. Sanguinetti (1994) Fiscal Inconsistencies and High Inflation. Journal of Development Economics.
Fanelli, J. y D. Heymann (2002). Dilemas Monetarios en la Argentina. Desarrollo Económico, Enero-Abril
4. Mercados de crédito e intermediación financiera
Hirschleifer, J. (1970). Investment, Interest and Capital. Cap. 9. Prentice Hall.
Bebczuk, R. (2000). Información Asimétrica en Mercados Financieros. Cambridge University Press. Cap. 1 y 2.
Blanchard, O. y Fisher (1989). Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cap 3. MIT Press.
Freixas X. y Rochet J. Microeconomics of Banking. MIT Press. Capítulos 4 y 5
.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review. 71: 393-410.
Jaffee, D. y R. Stiglitz. Credit Rationing, Handbook of Monetary Economics.
Mankiw, G. (1986). The allocation of credit and financial collapse. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 101 (3).:455-70.
Petersen, M. y R. Rajan. (1994). The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data. Journal of Finance. 49, 3-37.
Freixas X. y Rochet J., Microeconomics of Banking. MIT Press. Capítulo 1 y 2.
Diamond, D. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic Studies. 51: 393-414.
Diamond, D. (1996). Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simple Example. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Quarterly Review, Volume 82/3, Summer.
Stiglitz, J. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. The World bank Economic Review 4, 351-366.
James (1987). Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans. Journal of Financial Economics.19, 217-235.
Datta, Iskandar, Patel. (1999). Bank Monitoring and the pricing of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 435–449.
Williams, S. (1987). Recent Developments in Modeling Financial Intermediation. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. (Fall).
Bebczuk, R. (2000). Información Asimétrica en Mercados Financieros. Cambridge University Press. Cap. 8.
Freixas X. y Rochet J.. Microeconomics of Banking. Capítulo 7. MIT Press.
Chang, R. y Velasco A. (1998). Financial fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Working Paper.
Cooper & Ross (1998). Bank Runs: Deposit Insurance and capital Requirements. Department of Economics, Boston University, Working Paper.
Diamond, D. y Dybvig, P. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy. 91: 401-19. Reimpreso en Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. (Winter 2000).
Wallace, N. (1988). Another Attempt to Explain an Illiquid System: The Diamond and Dybvig Model with Sequential Service Taken Seriously. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. (Fall).
Expte. 900-1119/05 Res. 91/05
